A deep and rapid de-carbonisation of the world's energy systems is essential to meeting international goals for addressing climate change. But what is the role of the climate regime in facilitating such transitions? How do assumptions built into existing climate policy about how, when, why and for whom energy transitions are unfolding relate to practice on the ground?
Introduction
In June 2015 the G8 declared its intention to phase out the use of fossil fuels by the end of the century, affirming the need for radical decarbonisation in order to respond to climate change.
Now entering their 25
th year, the international climate change negotiations continue to be at the heart of this global response. Yet this landscape is changing. Once dominated by the pursuit of global targets and timetables, national governments now declare INDCs (Intended NationallyDetermined Contributions) for reducing GHG emissions. At the same time a host of other actors, from cities to corporations, regional governments to civil society organisations are being heralded as central to achieving progress and their actions tracked within the Non State Actor
Zone for Climate Action. The importance of engaging a range of actors and sites in the transition to a low carbon economy is now making its presence felt in the international climate policy regime. Yet the extent to which this shift from the mega-multilateralism that has dominated international environmental policy for the past two decades raises challenges for the fundamental principles and measures upon which global responses are being sought has yet to be scrutinised.
In this paper we seek to open up this question. At the heart of the climate negotiations are fundamental questions of securing national level action, developing carbon markets and other sources of finance, as well as facilitating the development and transfer of technology. We suggest that in each case the realities of how energy system transitions so vital to delivering international goals are unfolding raise significant challenges to the assumptions upon which such frameworks are being built. In short, it is not only that new actors are needed, but also the means through which low carbon transitions are (and are not) being pursued need to be rethought.
Research focusing on the development and contestation of climate policy has tended to neglect the ways in which socio-technical systems both structure and open up the possibilities for decarbonisation. In contrast, research on socio-technical transitions has focused on how existing incumbent systems might come under pressure or be reshaped through processes of innovation. Transitions studies have examined how both social and technical innovations come to be incorporated in or challenge dominant systems and how change occurs, with less explicit interest in the dynamics of power and politics through which such transitions are forged and resisted. In this sense, questions of climate policy and politics have been relegated to a general landscape pressure on existing socio-technical systems and relatively absent from the study of intricacies of transition processes in particular sectors or places.
In this paper, we seek to bring the changing nature of international climate policy and the realities of energy transition into conversation. We explore this interface through recent research on energy system transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Kenya, South Mozambique. The data was gathered using energy finance datasets (such as Bloomberg Energy Finance), policy reports, press releases and web-based sources and then triangulated with findings from interviews and project site visits. The research in Kenya involved a further 29 interviews with government officials, donors and businesses conducted during 2013 and reflections gleaned from a dissemination event on the research held in Nairobi in 2014. For reasons of space the evidence from these cases is necessarily used to illustrate the broader schisms between international climate policy and the practice of transitions in these settings rather than provide a more systematically comparative account of energy transitions across the three countries.
International Climate Policy and Low Carbon Transitions
The global landscape of carbon emissions that confronted policy-makers in the early days of seeking to negotiate an international agreement was relatively straightforward. Countries could be divided into those whose economies had contributed to current levels of GHG emissions (OECD 2013; World Bank 2012 ). Yet this model has been troubled both by the empirical realities of how, where and by whom low carbon transitions are emerging, but also by critiques of their underlying assumptions. The ongoing emphasis upon markets as a means of realising low carbon transitions continues in spite of the poor performance of carbon trading to date, the very low price of carbon world-wide and the low levels of activity in the CDM, once thought to be the success story of the Kyoto Protocol. This experience suggests, at the very least, that policy design and delivery in this area has not adequately accounted for the relationship between establishing market mechanisms and the political economies and practices of decarbonisation.
Equally fundamentally, it has been argued that current approaches to technology transfer are constrained by a lack of engagement with the role of the private sector, an assumption that technology primarily flows from countries in the 'North' to those in the 'South', and a limited evaluation of the impacts of the transfer of technology as 'hardware' rather than 'software' (Pueyo et al. 2012; Ockwell and Mallett 2012) where there has been a lack of attention to the institutional and social dimensions of innovation (De Coninck and Sagar 2014: 2-3). Counter to the dominant narrative within international climate policy, transition studies suggest that innovation is an ongoing processes and that while finance and technology are necessary conditions for transition, they are far from sufficient (Kern 2011) .
With the emergence within the IPCC and the GCF of the language of transformative change, in which paradigmatic shifts towards low carbon and climate resilient forms of development are regarded as the goal of interventions, there is an increasing engagement with the notion of transition within the climate policy field (Winkler and Dubash 2015) . We suggest that understanding how and why transitions to low carbon economies are unfolding in different national contexts can provide further insight into how and why the international climate policy regime may or may not be effective in furthering its own goals.
The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa
The trajectories In Sub-Saharan Africa, a multiplicity of energy systems concurrently provide energy services including those based on fuelwood, kerosene, small-scale renewables, large-scale hydro, coalfired generation (particularly in South Africa), while there is significant investment in the development and export of fossil fuel resources including gas and oil. Despite this, access to energy services is lowest in sub-Saharan Africa of any world region, with significant implications for reaching the new Sustainable Development Goal to 'Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all'. Furthermore, with the population expected to both grow and urbanise over the coming century, the International Energy Agency predict that energy demand will grow by around 80% by 2040 in sub-Saharan Africa (IEA 2014), much of which will be met by expanded use of fossil fuels unless incentives are put in place to pursue an alternative pathway.
In this context, there has been growing interest in how to support the development of low carbon energy transitions where measures "to address energy poverty can also be those that would set countries on the much-sought alternative path to low-carbon development (Christian Aid 2011). There is also a strong donor discourse about 'climate-compatible' development which advocates interventions that deliver the 'triple win' of poverty alleviation, climate adaptation and climate mitigation (Mitchell and Maxwell 2010) , mirrored in the concept of transformative change for low carbon transitions (Winkel and Dubash 2015) . As this narrative gathers pace, significant hope is being invested in international climate policy as a means through which to contribute to such forms of development Indeed the preamble to the Paris Agreement states the 'need to promote universal access to sustainable energy in developing countries, in particular in Africa, through the enhanced deployment of renewable energy' (UNFCCC 2015) . At the same time, the growing interest in Africa's fossil fuel resources suggests that any low carbon transition is far from a foregone conclusion. In the rest of this section, we draw on recently completed research in South Africa, Kenya and Mozambique to examine the ways in which low carbon transitions are (and are not) being fostered.
Governing energy system transitions
Under the auspices of the UNFCCC, states are the key actors expected to negotiate and implement international agreements. According to transition theory they are expected to perform key steering and convening functions among disparate social actors with competing interests in order to achieve transformative change (Meadowcroft 2005 ). Yet conceptually and empirically such state-led models of climate policy and energy transitions has been found wanting. Research has demonstrated the ever more significant role of transnational forms of climate governance and the multiplicity of actors and forms of authority involved in governing climate change at different scales alongside, through and with state-based organisations (Bulkeley et al. 2014; also UNEP 2015) . Moreover, in many settings it is clear the state is not in a position to perform key roles in relation to innovation, lacks convening power and resources to deliver targets and goals and often also has only limited autonomy to assert policy preferences that diverge from those of transnational businesses, donors and other powerful
states. Especially where they are heavily aid dependent (such as Mozambique) or through processes of power sector reform have relinquished a degree of control over the energy system to private providers (Tellam 2000; Bayliss and Fine 2007) , many states find it hard to set the terms of energy sector reforms aimed at de-carbonisation even if they have the political will to undertake them. In the case of Kenya, for example, donors funded and coordinated the conclusion of the country's National Action Plan on Climate Change . More problematically still from the point of view of de-carbonisation is the fact that states often seek to manage the pace of change on terms which protect key incumbent, often fossil fuel, interests even allowing them to determine levels of market access for new independent power producers as has occurred in South Africa. This cautions against underestimating the degree of incumbency power and the close links between the state and key energy providers often with major interests in fossil fuels, or what in the South African context is referred to as the mineralsenergy-complex with key para-statals such as Eskom at its heart (Baker et al 2014) .
Rather than it being a matter of a national energy regime being subject to singular transition Their impact of carbon markets has also been geographically highly uneven. It has long been apparent that investor interest sparked by carbon trading did not lead to extensive investments in sub-Saharan Africa where CDM projects make up less than 2% of registered projects (CDM pipeline 2015). As powerful blocs such as the EU have sought to address this by buying larger volumes of credits from least developed countries, there should be potential for countries like to Mozambique to benefit from carbon finance. Yet structural problems around infrastructure, access to finance, the low price of electricity and weak regulatory systems continue to inhibit market-based mechanisms such as the CDM in SSA. This is in spite of the efforts of international institutions such as the World Bank (though its carbon finance assist and market readiness programmes for example) and many regional and bilateral donor efforts to boost developing country capacity to effectively screen, host and capture benefits from such projects. Whether future climate finance for 'clean energy' comes from carbon markets or other sources, the issue will be same: whether it is at a scale and level of certainty that will shift the calculus of powerful state and private actors rather than be seen as something which merely reduces risk and adds value to existing projects. Securing carbon financing is more often than not an 'if there's one thing I've learned it's don't base your business on carbon revenue… basing it on carbon increases risk'. Each of these financial actors have critical, but different, roles to play in financing competing energy trajectories through financing infrastructures, projects, and investments in carbon markets such that 'different transformations need different types of finance' (Spratt 2015:159) .
Evidence suggests that in
Levering private finance to address energy poverty, energy security and climate change also needs to be balanced with significant disincentives for business-as-usual investments in energy.
This implies a substantial shift of subsidies and support from the fossil fuel economy to a low carbon economy. This is sensitive terrain for donors, concerned about being seen to be pushing a low carbon energy agenda in countries where tackling energy access remains the priority, and where governments often request funds for fossil fuel development accordingly. While donors are investing in off-grid, pro-poor affordable energy, many governments remain wedded to high carbon pathways. For example an IFC official in Kenya suggested: 'With the discovery of oil in Turkana and coal in Kitui areas, the government is becoming more assertive. The government offered a 1000MW opportunity on coal, but donors and investors are reluctant in investing in it because of the greenhouse gas effects'.
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For some commentators, achieving transformational change requires greater levels of national ownership over the agenda for low carbon development and a move away from metrics that are too tightly coupled to emissions reductions (Winkler and Dubash 2015) . Yet a focus on national ownership is no panacea, for it neglects what transitions scholars refer to as 'landscape' pressures that are critical in order to re-align the incentives and shift regimes to move away from fossil fuels. Climate change and carbon market finance under the UNFCCC can help to make lower carbon pathways more attractive by reducing risks for investors, offering lines of otherwise unavailable credit and funding projects that are 'additional'. But the CDM or even the GCF are either too small scale or too weak amid low carbon prices, or insufficiently advanced , to drive a shift at the landscape or regime level. Transitions studies suggests that unless there is alignment between the regime and niche, niches will remain just that (Geels 2002) . There is a real need for donors and MDBS to help tackle incumbent power through shifts in lending practices as well as support to initiatives to reduce fossil fuel subsidies and to apply pressure on private financial actors to divest their investments in fossil fuels. This of course is where ambitious global climate policy could have a significant role to play.
Technology Transfer
Negotiations about which an increasing number of actors -private, public, domestic, international are involved in technology transfer (De Coninck and Sagar 2014: 1) . Emphasising the plurality of actors is not to downplay the role of the state. Quite the contrary. As Rennkamp and Boyd note: "technology transfer can be sales-driven or capability-driven. Capability-driven technology transfer can benefit local industry development, job creation, and poverty reduction in the longer term.
These benefits reflect the government's priorities in its development goals, which appear in various policy strategies and plans" (Rennkamp and Boyd 2015: 12) . This is vital because, for example, South Africa needs cleaner technologies in order to achieve its emissions reduction
targets, yet very few of these technologies are manufactured locally. where the costs of grid expansion are high and where new business models for provision are emerging, yet: "care should be taken to ensure that the technologies employed do not imply a lock-in to perpetually low-power electricity consumption" (NCE 2014: 20) .
Building the infrastructures and networks to support, finance and sustain such innovations is critical and often not amendable to one-off, donor-driven projects. Effectively technology transfer has to shift from the transfer of individual hardware to establishing new socio-technical systems if it is to enable low carbon transitions. The terms upon which, and by whom, these systems are established is of course critical to their transformative potential. We need to take into account the informal networks, the role of innovation system builders which enable innovation in more organic ways, though there is a key role for donors as work in Kenya shows (Ockwell et al 2014) . This is not then a matter of getting the 'business model' or 'price' right, but it is about assembling new systems, and that requires all kinds of social, cultural and political work alongside creating markets, in particular developing domestic 'capability' for technology. This challenges the increasingly popular but uncritical narrative which reduces the role of technology to questions of 'scaling-up' and of 'de-risking' private finance rather than paying sufficient attention to the range of actors that have to be enrolled in technology development and diffusion if it is to be both socially and environmentally beneficial.
Conclusions: Implications for Climate Policy
The challenge of decarbonisation entails multiple requirements, drivers and dimensions.
Addressing climate change is central to this challenge and the policy architecture built up around the UNFCCC critical to its achievement. Yet given the diversity of actors and drivers and the limited direct reach and influence of international climate policy, there is an urgent need to consider how the climate regime can best support the embryonic transitions that are slowly taking form around the world in ways that it has failed to thus far. To do this effectively, we have argued, requires moving beyond notions of a cohesive state serving as rule-enforcer and transition manager. It also requires a broader view of technology, not just as hardware that is transferred, but as a set of practices and networks of expertise and enabling actors. And while markets have an important role to play as vehicles for achieving broader ends, they are not an end in themselves but rather one (and not the only) tool capable of shifting socio-technical systems in lower carbon directions. Further, while acknowledging the important role of climate aid, often as a multiplier or facilitator of more ambitious private flows, it is critical to differentiate between the types of finance required for different transitions, some of which will be counted under the climate regime and directed by it, but the majority of which will not.
In sum, the transition to a low carbon economy is being built in ways and in numerous sites that the climate regime needs to be cognisant of and engage with productively. Critical decisions about constructing, financing and politically embedding (low) carbon pathways are being made by a vast range of actors in numerous arenas in ways not directly shaped by the climate regime, but where a greater appreciation of them can improve the effectiveness of global climate policy and the assumptions it makes about the drivers of change.
